Discover the Petrojarl-Rosebank: Ratings & Maritime News

In a bold demonstration of environmental activism, Greenpeace activists targeted the 'PetroJarl Rosebank' as it departed from Walvis Bay in Namibia after refueling. The floating production, storage, and offloading unit (FPSO) was en route to the Rosebank oil and gas development situated off the Shetland Islands on the UK Continental Shelf. Utilizing the iconic 'Rainbow Warrior III', four activists approached the FPSO aboard rigid-hulled inflatable boats and kayaks, managing to spray paint the message ‘they profit, we pay’ prominently on its hull. Meanwhile, an additional six activists surrounded the FPSO, holding banners that expressed opposition to the project, as the Rainbow Warrior proudly displayed a massive banner strung between its masts reading “Stop Rosebank.” This direct action comes in the backdrop of the FPSO's recent refueling stop in Namibia before it heads toward the Rosebank field, where oil giants Shell, Equinor, and Ithaca are eagerly waiting for the necessary approvals from the UK government to commence production. Notably, this incident marks the second time within five days that Greenpeace has targeted the FPSO; they previously unfurled their “Stop Rosebank” banner on March 20, 2025. As the FPSO continues its journey being towed to UK waters, it remains to be seen how the unfolding situation will impact the contentious Rosebank project.

On November 22, 2017, an unfortunate incident occurred while conducting a test of the man overboard (MOB) boat installation on the 'Petrojarl Knarr' at the Knarr oil field. As part of the testing process, the supplier conducted a maneuver that involved swinging the davit beyond the vessel's side. However, during this operation, a hydraulic failure occurred on the davit, resulting in the MOB boat plunging into the sea. A nearby standby vessel quickly responded and managed to secure a tow on the boat initially. Unfortunately, the towing line gave way, causing the MOB boat to drift away uncontrollably. Fortunately, there were no crew members aboard the boat at the time of the incident. The standby vessel maintained visual contact with the drifting boat, which was heading towards Icelandic waters. Recovery efforts were planned for the following morning after weather conditions improved. Ultimately, the MOB boat was successfully retrieved.

The Petroleum Safety Authority (PSA) of Norway has disclosed several compliance issues in Shell's management of flexible risers, transfer lines, and safety equipment on the Knarr floating production and storage offloading (FPSO) unit. Located in the North Sea, approximately 50 kilometers northeast of Snorre and west of Måløy in Sogn og Fjordane county, the Knarr field operates at a depth of 410 meters. This offshore field is developed with subsea wells connected to the Petrojarl Knarr FPSO, which commenced production in March 2015. Oil extracted from Knarr is offloaded into tankers, while gas is transported to St. Fergus in Scotland. The PSA conducted an audit from October 3-6, 2016, assessing Shell's oversight of flexible risers and transfer lines, along with Teekay's role as the production operator. Although the Petrojarl Knarr FPSO received an acknowledgment of compliance (AoC) from PSA in October 2014, the recent audit uncovered multiple non-conformities. These issues include inadequate overpressure protection for the gas export pipeline, insufficient oversight of performance requirements related to overpressure systems, and lapses in passive fire protection. Moreover, the audit highlighted necessary improvements in equipment labeling, verification processes, and maintenance management. Shell (AS Norske Shell) has been managing the field since taking over from BG Group Norway in February 2016, and together with Teekay, they have been instructed to submit a report by February 1, 2017. This report must address how they plan to resolve the identified non-conformities and assess the improvement points raised during the audit.

On March 24, 2015, a significant fire erupted on the Petrojarl Knarr Floating Production Storage and Offloading (FPSO) unit, stationed in Norwegian offshore waters. Following rigorous inquiry by the Petroleum Safety Authority (PSA) of Norway, findings indicated that a combination of design faults and inadequate operational protocols contributed to the unfortunate incident. Owned by Teekay and operated by BG Group, the Petrojarl Knarr FPSO was launched in 2014 and stands as Teekay's largest vessel. The FPSO has been chartered by BG Group for an initial period of 14 years with options for extension. The fire began in the morning when a prior power outage caused systems to go offline. Investigators from PSA reported that once power was reinstated, the HVAC system's fans were not reactivated, yet steam continued to feed into the heat exchanger. Consequently, this led to an excessive heat buildup around the air filter cassette, culminating in ignition approximately eight hours post-outage. The blaze ignited in the HVAC system, located directly below the living quarters of the FPSO. Fortunately, fire damper valves prevented smoke from infiltrating the crew's living space. Firefighting measures successfully extinguished the flames approximately 30 minutes after they first appeared. The PSA's investigation identified multiple breaches and shortcomings, emphasizing both technical design oversights and failures in emergency protocols. A critical design flaw allowed steam heating system valves to remain open even when fans ceased operation, with the HVAC unit's steam temperature reaching dangerous levels around 100°C—exceeding the filter cassettes' maximum withstand temperature of 70°C. Furthermore, the necessary 'black start' procedure, intended to bring the fan systems back online after power loss, was inadequately executed. Additional concerns arose regarding the classification of alarm signals within the Central Control Room (CCR). Alarms from the HVAC unit, which resulted from the power failure, were deemed non-critical and relegated to the lowest priority, reducing response efficiency. The investigation indicated a lack of clarity in system documentation regarding operational limits and protocols for manual operations, along with insufficient knowledge among personnel regarding the potential consequences of various system operational modes. This deficiency extended to unclear roles and responsibilities during system operations, highlighting the need for improved training and documentation to enhance future safety measures on board such vessels.