Working Conditions Aboard the Ever-Given

A new study reveals staggering costs incurred during the Suez Canal blockade caused by the 'Ever Given' in 2021. Conducted by a European research team in partnership with the University of Gothenburg, the analysis indicates that A.P. Møller - Maersk faced losses amounting to $89 million. This incident has laid bare the vulnerabilities in global supply chains and the significant costs linked to disruptions. Notably, a whopping $76 million of Maersk's losses stemmed from expenses related to maintaining container warehousing, while ship-related and environmental costs accounted for the remaining balance. This compelling research underscores the urgent need for strategic contingency plans and alternative transportation routes to mitigate future disruptions, according to Kevin Cullinane, professor at the School of Business, Economics and Law at the University of Gothenburg. The findings are derived from an examination of Maersk’s fleet, which constitutes around one-third of all commercial vessels impacted by the blockade. In total, 69 of Maersk's vessels experienced effects, either through rerouting around the Cape of Good Hope or facing delays within the Suez Canal itself. The extended voyages and waiting periods subsequently resulted in an increase of 44,574 tonnes in carbon emissions for Maersk’s fleet. Additionally, the Suez Canal Authority recorded a loss of $5.9 million due to decreased traffic during this period. “This research not only highlights the substantial economic risks associated with international logistics but also illustrates the severe implications disruptions have on everyday operations,” remarked Hercules Haralambides, professor at Dalian Maritime University, Erasmus University Rotterdam, and the Sorbonne Centre for Economics.

A.P. Moller-Maersk A/S has officially settled a lawsuit in Denmark against the entities responsible for the infamous 'Ever Given' incident, which brought the Suez Canal to a standstill in March 2021. This blockade caused significant delays and disruptions within global shipping routes, affecting numerous shipping lines. The announcement, made on November 29, 2023, revealed that the Copenhagen-based shipping giant has chosen to withdraw its case without disclosing specifics regarding the terms of the settlement or naming the parties involved. The 'Ever Given', operated by Evergreen Marine Corp., had been at the center of the controversy, with Maersk initially seeking 300 million kroner (approximately $44 million) from Denmark's Maritime and Commercial Court to cover losses incurred during the incident. However, Evergreen has consistently denied any liability related to damages claimed by Maersk. As the details remain under wraps, this settlement marks a significant development in the aftermath of one of the most notable maritime blockages in recent history.

The Panama Maritime Authority has officially submitted a detailed accident investigation report regarding the grounding of the *Ever Given* on March 23, 2021, in the Suez Canal to the International Maritime Organization (IMO). The report firmly states, "the Captain has command of the ship at all times," underscoring the responsibility of the ship's master during navigational incidents. On the day in question, the *Ever Given* encountered strong winds that caused it to become lodged across the canal, effectively halting maritime traffic until it could be dislodged. A critical moment in this event unfolded at approximately 07:38 HRS / LT, when the helmsman reported that the vessel's direction was shifting from port to starboard amidst increasing speeds of around 13 knots. Despite the pilot's initial orders to adjust the rudder to port, the *Ever Given* continued its rapid turning towards the starboard canal bank. Ineffective communication between the pilots, who began conversing in a local dialect, compounded the situation, leading to a failure in risk assessment and the implementation of corrective actions. The vessel ultimately grounded at a speed of about 12 knots on the eastern bank of the canal at 07:41 HRS / LT, specifically at coordinates 30 01.059N / 032 34.810E, located 151 KM from Suez. The investigators concluded that while the pilots conducted their duties, they failed to seek assistance from the Captain, who possessed valuable insights on the vessel's maneuverability. Though the Captain guided the helmsman to maintain the vessel in the center of the channel, these instructions fell short in averting the grounding incident. Regulatory guidelines for the Suez Canal stipulate a maximum permissible speed limit of 8.64 knots, while the *Ever Given* consistently exceeded this threshold. The report emphasizes that effective communication amongst the bridge crew and pilots is essential and reveals that discussions in Arabic limited the bridge team's ability to evaluate hazards, perform risk assessments, or request help from the Vessel Traffic Management System (VTMS). Furthermore, it highlights that neither the pilots, the Captain, nor the VTMS adequately accounted for adverse weather conditions, like strong winds and poor visibility, which posed significant risks for a vessel of such size. As a response, the report recommends a series of preventive measures for maritime crews, including: 1. Prior to transiting the Suez Canal, it's crucial for the Captain to convene with deck and engine officers to clarify marine practices for enhanced teamwork and safety awareness. 2. Establish a common language, preferably English, during familiarization meetings between the pilot and the Captain to ensure clear communications. 3. Encourage the bridge team to remain vigilant regarding the pilot's competence, as a pilot may lack familiarity with the specific vessel's design, meriting the Captain's intervention when necessary. 4. Monitor and verify that the pilot's directives are followed promptly and effectively, while adhering to a well-structured passage plan. 5. When approaching significant turns, vessels must maintain utmost caution and observe safe speeds, positioning themselves centrally in the canal to minimize potential bank effects. The rate of turn should ideally not exceed 10°/min.