Reviews & Ratings for the Gunde-Maersk

A recent report from the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) sheds light on the engine room fire that occurred aboard the Gudne Maersk on December 8, 2015. The incident, which took place at 5:09 a.m. shortly after departing from Terminal 46 in Seattle, Washington, was traced back to a poorly installed fitting on the fuel line leading to an auxiliary engine fuel injector pump. This mishap emerged just days after the vessel transitioned from heavy fuel oil to ultra-low sulfur marine gas oil as it entered the North American Emission Control Area (ECA). The swift response of the ship’s high-pressure water mist system effectively extinguished the fire, preventing any environmental damage and ensuring the safety of the 23 crew members on board. However, the Gudne Maersk lost propulsion as a result of the fire and had to be assisted back to its berth by tugboats, incurring an estimated $380,000 in damages. In the lead-up to the fire, the crew had noticed fuel leaks in the three auxiliary engines, each a powerful 4,667-horsepower Caterpillar engine linked to the electrical generators of the vessel. The crew undertook a comprehensive repair effort, replacing O-rings in several components of the fuel supply system in response to the leaks. The installation of new O-rings took place with diligence, including a safety job analysis and compliance with the company's permit-to-work process. Specifically, the O-rings were replaced on auxiliary engine no. 3 on November 26, auxiliary engine no. 2 on December 1, and auxiliary engine no. 1 on December 2. Following installation, the crew tested the engine at idle speed for 10 minutes, but the fuel flow was noted to be below normal levels. Only three hours had passed since the installation of the new O-rings when the fire broke out in auxiliary engine room no. 1. The NTSB's investigation pinpointed the cause of the blaze to fuel leaking from a dislodged 1.5-inch-diameter O-ring connected to the no. 3 cylinder fuel injection pump. Pressurized fuel sprayed out and interacted with both the exhaust components and shields designed to mitigate such an occurrence. Critical to the timeline, the fuel overflow tank alarm triggered just 13 seconds before the fire alarm went off, indicating a prolonged leak prior to ignition. Notably, investigators determined the integrity of the bolts and fittings at the leak site was intact, and the examined O-ring showed no damage. The likely issue, according to the NTSB, was that the fitting was not tightened with the proper torque wrench as required, agitating concerns over adherence to maintenance protocols. A root cause report from the Gudne Maersk's operating company pointed out the absence of a post-repair testing procedure for the O-ring replacement, suggesting that if a standardized testing procedure had been employed, the fuel leak—and consequent fire—might have been avoided. The NTSB’s findings highlight a troubling trend in maritime operations where failure to rigorously follow established maintenance protocols continues to result in accidents. The organization strongly advocates for strict adherence to standardized operating procedures, including proper tool usage, to ensure the operational safety and integrity of maritime equipment. The situation aboard the Gudne Maersk serves as a crucial reminder of the potential ramifications of disregarding such standards.